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Mon, Sept 28th, 2026

China puts US coal on its own tariff-cut list, and Trump says he may ban diesel exports, plus Geely buys into NIO's battery-swap network and prediction markets now expect a Fed hike in October.

01Score68

China puts US coal on its own tariff-cut list, confirming what only Washington had claimed

Summary

China's Commerce Ministry published a list of 1,619 US products on September 28, 2026 that will return to ordinary most-favoured-nation tariff rates, and coal is on it — the commitment to buy at least 10 million tonnes of US coal a year in 2027 and 2028, previously stated only by the White House, now has the Chinese duty cut it needs, while US met-coal producers last closed 13–37% below their late-summer highs.

On September 28, 2026 the United States and China released reciprocal lists for a “30-for-30” deal agreed at the September 24, 2026 Trump–Xi summit in Washington, under which each side cuts tariffs on $30 billion of the other’s non-sensitive goods. China’s Commerce Ministry list covers 1,619 US items, including grains, meat, seafood, wood products, medical devices and coal. More than 90% of listed products will have all the additional tariffs the two countries imposed on each other removed, leaving only most-favoured-nation rates.

Beijing confirmed that tariffs on US coal are included in the framework. That matters because China’s first summit readout, published through Xinhua and reported on September 26, 2026, left out the White House’s claim that “China will import at least 10 million metric tons of coal from the United States in 2027 and again 2028.” Both sides say the cuts take effect simultaneously once domestic legal procedures are complete; no date has been given.

China added a 15% tariff on US coal in February 2025 and a further surcharge in April 2025, and EIA reports US coal exports to China fell 92% in 2025. EIA trade data show the US shipped about 8.8 million short tons of metallurgical coal and 4.3 million short tons of steam coal to China in 2024, about 13.1 million short tons (roughly 11.9 million metric tonnes) in all; in the first quarter of 2026 it shipped 67,383 short tons. Norfolk and Baltimore handled 62% of all US coal exports over the past five years.

Met-coal equities sold off through September. As of the September 25, 2026 close, the last before either announcement, Ramaco Resources (METC, $9.02) was 37.4% below its September 2 close, Alpha Metallurgical Resources (AMR, $174.43) 26.0% below its August 31 close, Warrior Met Coal (HCC, $89.51) 17.5% below September 2, Core Natural Resources (CNR, $89.02) 13.3% below September 2 and Peabody (BTU, $25.44) 14.3% below August 31.

Opportunity

Until September 28, 2026 the coal commitment was a one-sided US statement of the kind China has missed before, and the sensible discount was steep. The Chinese list changes the mechanics: a purchase target set alongside a 28% duty (S&P Global’s November 5, 2025 figure for US met coal) is a political promise, while the same target with the duty back to the ordinary rate is simply a buyer reopening a market where US coal competed before 2025.

The volume matters because of what it restores. The pledged 10 million tonnes a year is close to the entire 2024 flow, and about three-quarters of that flow was Appalachian met coal. When China closed, those tonnes were sold into India and other markets where US coal is the swing, freight-disadvantaged supplier, so the loss showed up in realised prices as well as volumes.

Hypothesis: a second deep outlet for US high-volatility coking coal raises realised prices for Appalachian exporters more than the headline volume suggests, because it lets them stop discounting into India against Australian supply. The group sold off on met-coal weakness in September and had not traded on the Chinese confirmation, which suggests the market is still valuing these producers without a China outlet.

Hypothesis: the pledge covers 2027 and 2028, so the first place this shows up is the Q4 2026 contracting season for 2027 volumes rather than near-term shipments, which gives investors months in which the change is visible in contracts before it is visible in export data.

How it could play out

Both governments finish their legal steps and the MFN rate applies to US coal → Chinese steel mills and traders test US high-volatility coking coal again in Q4 2026 for 2027 delivery → Appalachian tonnes shift from discounted Indian sales to China, lifting realised prices and railing more coal through Norfolk and Baltimore → producers with Appalachian met exposure and their own export terminals report better realisations and 2027 contract books → the September selloff is re-rated.

The failure path: implementation drags with no effective date, Chinese mills buy only enough to show compliance, and Australian and Mongolian coal pushed out of China simply fills the Indian tonnes US producers vacate, leaving prices unchanged.

Questions worth asking

  • Is the 10 million tonnes additive to Chinese demand, or does it only reshuffle seaborne trade so that US coal goes to China and Australian coal goes to India, leaving benchmark prices where they were?
  • What exactly is China’s most-favoured-nation duty on each coal category, and how does the landed cost of US coal compare with Australian, Canadian and Mongolian coal once the extra tariffs are gone?
  • Which US producers sold to China in 2024, and through which terminals? Core Natural Resources owns a Baltimore export terminal; Alpha ships through Norfolk.
  • Is a private exporter such as Xcoal, rather than the miners themselves, the real counterparty, and what does that mean for which listed miners get the tonnes?
  • Who loses? Mongolian coal delivered by rail and Australian coal sold into China both face a returning competitor.

Where to look

  • Core Natural Resources (CNR) — owns the CONSOL Marine Terminal in Baltimore and produces both export thermal and Appalachian met coal
  • Alpha Metallurgical Resources (AMR) — the largest US met-coal exporter, Central Appalachian, shipping through Norfolk
  • Ramaco Resources (METC) — small Central Appalachian met producer, the hardest-hit of the group in September
  • Warrior Met Coal (HCC) — Alabama met coal shipped from Mobile, historically sold mostly to Europe and Asia, a test of whether China matters outside Appalachia
  • Norfolk Southern (NSC) and CSX (CSX) — rail carriers to Norfolk and Baltimore, where most US coal exports leave
  • Mongolian Mining Corporation (0975.HK) — a cross-border supplier of coking coal into northern China and a candidate loser

Thesis check

The chain is now anchored on both sides: a White House purchase commitment plus a Chinese Commerce Ministry list that puts US coal back on ordinary tariff rates, primary EIA data showing a market that went from about 13 million short tons to almost nothing, and producers that had not traded on either announcement.

The weak links are timing and fungibility. The cuts have no effective date and the purchases start in 2027, and coal is a global commodity, so if Chinese buying only displaces Australian and Mongolian tonnes into India the benefit to Alpha, Core, Ramaco and Warrior may be smaller than the volume headline implies.

Timing

Tariff cuts take effect once both governments complete domestic legal procedures, no date set; 2027 annual coal contracts are negotiated in Q4 2026

Sources

Business Standard, Sep 28 2026 · SBS News, Sep 28 2026 · CNN via KVIA, Sep 28 2026 · ABC News (AP), Sep 28 2026 · Business Standard, Sep 26 2026 · S&P Global, Nov 5 2025 · EIA Today in Energy, Apr 1 2026 · America's Coal, Sep 24 2026

Open on its own pageFound Sep 28commodities
02Score63

Trump says he may ban US diesel exports, and the refiners abroad that would fill the gap have not moved up

Summary

President Trump said on September 27, 2026 that he is looking "very seriously" at banning diesel exports and "we may do it", a week after a White House official said no ban was being considered — US refiners have fallen about 6–7% from their September 18 highs, but the non-US refiners and renewable-diesel producers that would replace roughly 1.3–1.9 million barrels a day of US exports are flat or lower.

Speaking to a Fox News reporter at the Presidents Cup near Chicago on September 27, 2026, President Trump said of a US diesel export ban: “we’re looking at it very seriously — we may do it,” adding that it could raise gasoline prices slightly. National Economic Council Director Kevin Hassett, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Trade Representative Jamieson Greer have been analysing the proposal. Energy Secretary Chris Wright has floated voluntary export curbs agreed with refiners as a middle course; oil executives have proposed suspending the federal diesel excise tax instead.

This reverses the administration’s position of mid-September 2026, when a White House official said it was “not considering an export ban or export restrictions at this time” and Interior Secretary Doug Burgum said a ban would not lower prices. The US Chamber of Commerce and Business Roundtable warned against a ban in a joint letter reported on September 24, 2026.

EIA data show the US retail diesel price at $6.529 a gallon in the week of September 21, 2026, above the June 2022 peak of $5.816, and up from $5.599 on August 31. US distillate exports were 1.33 million barrels a day in the week to September 18, down from 1.94 million in the week to August 7; distillate stocks were 107.4 million barrels. Breakbulk News reports the US supplies about 18% of global seaborne diesel, 62% of it to Latin America and the Caribbean and 24% to Europe, and that US barrels are about 57% of Northwest Europe’s diesel imports from outside the region.

Wood Mackenzie estimates a blanket ban could push 700,000 barrels a day into storage and force US crude run cuts of more than 2 million barrels a day. On Polymarket, the probability of a ban by October 31, 2026 stood at 11.5% on September 28, 2026. As of September 25, 2026, Valero (VLO) and Marathon Petroleum (MPC) were 6.3% and 7.4% below their September 18 highs. On September 28, 2026 Reliance Industries (RELIANCE.NS) closed at ₹1,197.60, 18.2% below its May 5 high.

Opportunity

The loser side of a ban is priced and argued over: US Gulf Coast refiners that export diesel lose an outlet at record margins. The other side has barely been looked at. A ban would take out the supplier of about 18% of global seaborne diesel, most of it shipped within the Atlantic basin, in a year when the Strait of Hormuz disruption has already cut Middle East product flows.

The replacement barrels must come from farther away: Indian, Korean, Chinese and remaining Middle East export refiners, shipped on longer voyages. In Europe, renewable diesel (HVO) is a drop-in substitute for the fossil fuel that would stop arriving from the US Gulf.

Hypothesis: even a partial measure, such as the voluntary curbs Wright floated, would widen diesel margins everywhere outside the US while compressing them inside it. That transfers profit from Valero and Marathon to non-US export refiners such as Reliance and Motor Oil Hellas and to HVO producers such as Neste. None of those has moved up on the prospect, and Reliance is lower.

Hypothesis: the president’s own words have moved the ban from a congressional talking point to a live White House option, while the prediction market still prices it near 12%. The asymmetry sits in the owners of the replacement supply, which lose little if nothing happens.

How it could play out

Diesel stays above $6 into the harvest and the final weeks of the midterm campaign → the White House chooses a ban or “voluntary” export curbs → US Gulf Coast diesel backs up, US margins and run rates fall, and Atlantic-basin diesel cracks rise → Latin America and Europe bid for Indian, Korean and Middle East barrels and European blenders pay up for HVO → export refiners outside the US and long-range product tankers earn the margin US refiners lose.

The failure path: crude and diesel ease as Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline returns to service and US–Iran talks progress, the political pressure fades, and the administration settles for an excise-tax holiday that changes nothing for trade flows.

Questions worth asking

  • Would the administration choose voluntary refiner curbs rather than a formal ban, and would curbs of that kind move global diesel cracks enough to matter to non-US refiners?
  • Which non-US refiners have the spare export capacity and the freight economics to supply Brazil, Mexico, Chile and Northwest Europe at short notice?
  • Does a ban favour long-range product tankers carrying diesel from Asia and the Middle East, while the medium-range tankers that carry 88% of US diesel exports lose Atlantic work?
  • How much would a US ban lift European HVO premiums, and is Neste’s renewable diesel priced against fossil diesel closely enough to capture it?
  • Which Latin American fuel importers and distributors, particularly in Mexico, where diesel stocks fell to under six days of supply by April 2026 according to the Atlantic Council, are least able to replace US supply?

Where to look

  • Reliance Industries (RELIANCE.NS) — owner of Jamnagar, the world’s largest export refining complex, now 18% below its May high
  • Motor Oil Hellas (MOH.AT) — Greek export refiner supplying the Mediterranean and European diesel market
  • Neste (NESTE.HE) — the largest producer of renewable diesel, a drop-in replacement for fossil diesel in Europe
  • Scorpio Tankers (STNG) and Teekay Tankers (TNK) — product and crude tanker owners exposed to longer diesel voyages, both about 7% below their September highs
  • Petrobras (PETR4.SA) — Brazil’s domestic refiner, whose pricing and import needs shift if Brazil loses its main US diesel supply
  • Valero (VLO) and Marathon Petroleum (MPC) — the obvious losers, as the gauge of how much of a ban is already priced

Thesis check

The mechanism is simple and the facts are solid: the president is on record saying he may act, EIA data show record retail diesel prices and exports of 1.3–1.9 million barrels a day, and trade press has mapped where those barrels go and who would replace them.

The weak link is probability and duration. A ban would be unprecedented, business groups and parts of the administration oppose it, the prediction market still puts it near 12% by October 31, 2026, and a short ban lifted after the November 3 election would hand Reliance, Motor Oil Hellas and Neste a brief windfall rather than a lasting change.

Timing

A decision could come at any time before the US midterm elections on November 3, 2026; prediction-market odds of a ban by October 31, 2026 were 11.5% on September 28

Sources

Business Standard, Sep 28 2026 · Bloomberg, Sep 27 2026 · CNBC, Sep 28 2026 · CNBC, Sep 24 2026 · Breakbulk News, Sep 2026 · Atlantic Council, Sep 2026 · EIA weekly petroleum data, Sep 2026

Open on its own pageFound Sep 28energy

Also worth knowing

  • Geely is buying 30% of NIO’s battery-swap business — NIO agreed on September 27, 2026 to sell 30% of NIO Power to Geely Holding at a post-money valuation of about RMB16 billion ($2.4 billion); Geely pays with its own Yiyi swap business plus RMB640 million in cash, and NIO takes 10% of Geely’s charging arm. NIO Power ran 3,790 swap stations as of February 2026, and the deal needs regulatory approval.

    Geely, one of China’s largest carmakers, adopting a rival’s swap standard is the strongest sign yet that battery swapping could become shared infrastructure rather than one brand’s feature, which changes the economics for the battery and station suppliers behind it.

  • Prediction markets now expect the Fed to raise rates in October — On Polymarket on September 28, 2026, a 25-basis-point hike at the October meeting was priced at 65.5%, up 16 points in a week, and a hike by December at 79%; the market for no cuts at all in 2026 stood near 97%.

    A hiking cycle driven by an oil shock rather than by strong demand would hit floating-rate borrowers, housing and small-cap balance sheets at the same time as fuel costs, a different mix from the 2022 cycle.

  • The largest US–Mexico livestock crossing reopened on September 25 — USDA reopened the Santa Teresa, New Mexico port to Mexican cattle after a 16-month closure over New World screwworm; Border Report puts the trade through the crossing at about $1.2 billion. Bloomberg reported a new screwworm case in New Mexico on September 18, 2026, and Texas recorded 42 cases between June and late July 2026.

    Mexican feeder cattle are the fastest source of new supply in a historically tight US herd, so a sustained reopening would ease feeder-cattle prices and help beef packers such as Tyson, while a fresh case near the border could close it again.

  • Crusoe dropped its $1.25 billion order for Boom Supersonic’s power turbines — Crusoe said on September 25, 2026 that the jet-derived stationary turbines Boom was developing for its AI data centres are no longer in its near-term plans. Both companies are private.

    It is a data point against unconventional fixes for data-centre power while gas-turbine lead times run to 2032, and it pushes demand back toward conventional generation, reciprocating engines and the steam turbines and packaged boilers some developers are now ordering.

  • The EU pushed its vote on Tesla’s “Full Self-Driving” to December at the earliest — Electrek reported on September 25, 2026 that the vote on approving the system in Europe has slipped, days after Electrek reported the system sped in 55% of the Brussels 30 km/h zones it tested.

    European approval is one of the few near-term catalysts for Tesla’s software revenue outside the US and China, and the delay moves it into 2027 at the earliest if December slips too.

  • Tesla Semi entered volume production on September 25, seven years behind schedule — Electrek reported the start of volume output of the electric Class 8 truck the same week US retail diesel reached $6.53 a gallon.

    With diesel at record prices, the payback on battery-electric trucks has shortened sharply, which matters to fleet buyers, to charging providers for heavy trucks, and to diesel-engine makers such as Cummins.

  • Mercedes-Benz secured first access to ProLogium’s fourth-generation solid-state cells — Electrek reported on September 24, 2026 that the Taiwanese battery maker will supply Mercedes first with its Gen4 solid-state EV cells.

    A named first customer moves solid-state cells a step closer to production cars, and ProLogium’s factory plans in Taiwan and France will show how fast the equipment and materials suppliers behind it see orders.

  • Indonesia issued new coal-export rules as its state export agency takes over — On September 28, 2026 Indonesia’s Trade Ministry cited Regulation No. 15 of 2026 on coal-export policy while reporting January–July coal exports of $18.11 billion, up 8.36%; the state trading entity Danantara Sumberdaya Indonesia says exports have continued without disruption since routing through it began on September 1.

    The world’s largest thermal-coal exporter now sells through a single state gate with a stated aim of capturing trader margins, so any friction at year-end, when full enforcement begins in January 2027, would tighten supply for Asian utilities.

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